Tag Archives: Political Science

Avatar: Full of Commitment Problems

At the insistence of many of my friends, I started watching Avatar: The Last Airbender (the TV series, not the dreadful film). The show appears to take place on a post-apocalyptic Earth, where humans have been divided into four tribes (fire, water, earth, and air), which can “bend” their particular element as a means of weaponization.

The world is constantly at war. The show’s narration blames this on the disappearance of the disappearance of the Avatar, the traditional peacekeeper and only person capable of wielding all four elements.

However, the lack of the Avatar fails to explain the underlying incentive for war. Today’s pre-apocalyptic world does not have an avatar, and yet most countries most of the time are not at war with most other countries. Moreover, the Avatar theory does not address war’s inefficiency puzzle, i.e. how the costs of fighting imply the existence of negotiated settlements that are mutually preferable to war. Why not reach such an agreement and end the war that has completely devastated the world economy? The Avatar might be sufficient for peace but is by no means necessary.

In contrast, I propose that the underlying cause of war is the presence of rapid, exogenous power shifts. As described in the episode The Library, the fire tribe’s ability to bend fire disappears during a solar eclipse. Likewise, the water tribe’s ability to water bend disappears during a lunar eclipse. These rare events leave their respective tribes temporarily powerless. In turn, that tribe faces a commitment problem. For example, on the eve of a solar eclipse, the fire tribe would much enjoy reaching a peaceful settlement. In fact, they would be willing to promise virtually everything to achieve a resolution, since they will certainly be destroyed if a war is fought on the solar eclipse.

But such an agreement is inherently incredible. Suppose the other tribes accepted the fire tribe’s surrender. The solar eclipse passes uneventfully. Suddenly, the fire tribe has no incentive to abide by the terms of the peace treaty. After all, their power is fully restored, and they no longer face the threat of a solar eclipse. They will therefore demand an equitable share of the world’s bargaining pie.

Now consider the incentives the other tribes face. If they fail to destroy the fire tribe during the solar eclipse, the fire tribe will demand that equitable stake. But the other tribes could destroy the fire tribe during the eclipse and steal their share. That is a tempting proposition. Indeed, the other tribes likely cannot credibly commit to not taking advantage of the fire tribe’s temporary weakness.

Finally, think one further step back, once again from the perspective of the fire tribe. If the fire tribe does not successfully destroy the other tribes before the solar eclipse, they run the risk of being destroyed on that day. From that perspective, it is perfectly understandable why the fire tribe fights.

Thus, there are commitment problems abound in the world of Avatar. The fire tribe cannot credibly commit to remaining enfeebled after the solar eclipse. The other tribes cannot credibly commit to not attack the fire nation during the eclipse. War seems perfectly rational.

Interestingly, one way out of the problem is for the fire and water tribes to agree to protect one another during their eclipses. Given that, neither side has incentive to attack during the eclipse; if that tribe did join the other tribes in an attack, then it would be left without any protection during the next eclipse. (This resembles a trual–a dual with three people.) Yet, in the series, the fire and water tribes appear to be the most bitter enemies.

One wonders if the library contained a copy of Fearon 1995 or In the Shadow of Power. In any case, you can read more about preventive war in the third chapter of The Rationality of War or watch the below video:

New Working Paper: The Invisible Fist

Download the paper here.

Let’s start with a quote from President Obama, circa September 2009:

Iran must comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions…we have offered Iran a clear path toward greater international integration if it lives up to its obligations…but the Iranian government must now demonstrate…its peaceful intentions or be held accountable to…international law.

We’ve been dealing with the Iranian nuclear “crisis” for a while now. As the quote indicates, President Obama’s method of diplomacy is to offer Iran concessions and hope these carrots convince Iran not to build. His opponents have called such a plan naive; after all, why wouldn’t Iran takes those concessions, say thanks, and then build a nuclear weapon anyway? (Of course, his opponents have also suggested that we threaten to invade Iran to convince Iran not to build, even though such a threat is not credible in the least.)

When I first heard this quote, I fell into the opposing group. We don’t have any models that explain this type of bargaining behavior. In crises, fully realized power drives concessions. Yet, here, unrealized power is causing concessions, and Obama hopes that those concessions in turn mean that the power remains unrealized. I set out to develop a model to show that this type of agreement can never withstand the test of time.

I was wrong. The Invisible Fist shows that such agreements can hold up, even if a rising state can freely renege on the offers. Specifically, declining states offer most of what rising states would receive if they ever built the weapons. This is sufficient to buy off the rising states; while the rising states could build and receive more concessions, those additional concessions do not cover the cost of building. Meanwhile, the declining states are happy to engage in such agreements, because they can extract this building cost out of the rising states.

In any case, I think both the model and the paper’s substantive applications are interesting, so it is worth a look. Let me know what you think.

P.S. Slides here. Paper presentation below:

Unintended Consequences, Pt. 2: College Football Edition

Back during the Olympics, I wrote about badminton players intentionally playing to lose. Despite the absurdity of the situation, the Olympians were merely following one of political science’s most important laws:

Law: People will strategize according to the institutional features put in front of them.

We can now add college football players to the list of people who follow the rule. Over the off-season, the NCAA created a rule which forces a player whose helmet comes off during a play (incidental or otherwise) to sit out the following play. To the surprise of no one, defenders are now taking advantage of it. Here is the new game plan, in three simple steps:

  1. Get the opposing quarterback into a large pile.
  2. Take off his helmet.
  3. Profit.

The rule seems inherently bizarre. It’s understandable to force a player to sit out a play if his helmet explodes off of his head on a major hit; concussions are a major issue in football. But if the helmet just slides off (maliciously or otherwise) away from the action, there doesn’t seem to be much reason to force such a player out of the game temporarily.

Chapter 2 of The Rationality of War

The Rationality of War is now out! (Buy it on Amazon or Barnes & Noble.) You can download chapter two of the book as a free PDF by clicking here. This chapter explains the fundamental puzzle of war: if fighting is costly, why can’t two states agree to a peaceful settlement? With that puzzle in mind, the rest of the book shows why states sometimes end up in war.

Olympic Rules Shenanigans: Dolphin Kick Edition

Fresh off the silliness of the badminton play-to-lose scandal comes this lovely piece on dolphin kicks. Last weekend, South African Cameron van der Burgh won gold in the 100m breaststroke.

However, Australia’s Olympic committee is putting up a fuss, as video footage of van der Burgh clearly shows him executing three dolphin kicks after diving into the water. (An Australian swimmer finished in second.) Breaststroke competitions allow only one.

And van der Burgh does not give a damn. From the link:

If you’re not doing it, you’re falling behind. It’s not obviously–shall we say–the moral thing to do, but I’m not willing to sacrifice my personal performance and four years of hard work for someone that is willing to do it and get away with it.

You see, FINA (the governing body of swimming) does not use cameras underwater to check for illegal dolphin kicks. Moreover, Australia cannot formally appeal van der Burgh’s finish, as there is no formal appeal process.

Of course, an appeal probably wouldn’t do much good, considering the Australian swimmer did the exact same thing.

As with the badminton scandal, the real moral of the story is about institutional design. If you build a bad institution, it will lead to more bad things. Here, you should not create rules that you do not plan to enforce. The players who wish to abide by those rules face a stark choice: play “fair” or let the “unfair” win. So even those wishing to play fair break the rules, and we end up in a situation as though the rule does not exist.

Strangely, the dolphin kick rule could be enforced. FINA used underwater technology at the swimming World Cup in 2010. Everyone knew that dolphin kicks were prohibited and breaking the rules would not go unnoticed, so no one broke them.

Derp! Badminton Could Learn from Political Science (Or, Winning By Losing)

Political science doesn’t have many “laws” the way physics does. But here’s one of them:

Law: People will strategize according to the institutional features put in front of them.

Here’s a corollary that I think should follow from that:

Corollary: If one creates stupid institutional rules, one loses the right to object to people taking advantage of them.

Apparently the Olympic organizing group of badminton could learn from this law and its corollary. Yesterday, you see, eight players intentionally played to lose. Full story here.

The gist of it is this: Early in the day, the #2 team in the world lost their last group game, sending them to the bottom of the teams qualified for the quarterfinals. Later on, teams that were already qualified for the quarterfinals played to lose, concerned that a win would propel them to a high seed that force them to play the #2 team sooner in the elimination bracket. Oops.

Badminton officials were shocked–shocked!–that the players would resort to such a cunningly intelligent strategy. Furthermore, the officials complained that the players had violated a rule that protects against athletes “not using one’s best efforts to win a match”–as though one could reasonably discern what qualifies as “best effort” versus “a little bit less than best effort, but still enough effort to convince everyone that we actually care even though we don’t.”

Here are a couple of solutions for the Olympic badminton committee. First, you could schedule all of the final games group play simultaneously, to make it harder for teams to know to throw matches from the start. (Soccer pulls a similar trick in the Euro and World Cup, albeit for slightly different purposes.) Or you could have a single elimination tournament from the start.

Just don’t be surprised when players try to win…by losing.

Update: The players have been disqualified. Next time, I suggest feigning an injury.

The USA Today story also reports that the Japanese women’s soccer team intentionally sought to draw yesterday, as to avoid playing the United States in the quarterfinals.

Political Science Sucks at Marketing

Freakonomics recently ran a poll on which social science should be eliminated. Political science came in second, with 29.3% of the vote. (Sociology won–more accurately, lost–the poll with 49.1%. Strangely, despite this being Freakonomics, psychology had the fewest votes for elimination.)

Here is one of the comments a reader used to justify his vote:

Caleb B: “Poli Sci should die. It’s only a major for lawyers, lobbyists, and politicians. We need fewer of each.”

The sad part is that I think Caleb’s comments reflect the public’s general consensus of political science. As a discipline, we co-opted the undergraduate lawyer, lobbyist, and politician types so enough students would take our classes and we would continue to get funding from our universities. We tailored our syllabi accordingly to do this. Thus, like a vicious cycle, we keep dumbing down our undergrad classes and promulgating Caleb’s impression of political science.

It is our fault. If we as a discipline spent more time marketing real political science, I don’t think the House would have voted to cut National Science Foundation funding from departments.

Romney Should Release His Returns

If you have been following the 2012 campaign, you know that Mitt Romney has not released his tax returns from before 2010. This has caused speculation that Romney did something wrong during 2008 or 2009–anything from finding interesting (but legal) tax shelters for his Bain Capital income to participating in the IRS’s 2009 amnesty program. Romney has held firm, claiming that rivals are attempting to divert attention from important campaign issues to his tax life. Of course, this has backfired, inadvertently causing more speculation.

I did not fully appreciate the strategic aspects of the situation until reading this blog post from Daniel Shaviro. In it, he makes an important insight:

Romney’s reluctance to release any pre-2010 tax return might be that what it would show is worse than all the heat he is taking for non-disclosure.

I thought that was an interesting intuition. However, I have realized that it wrong, at least in the long run. No matter how bad Romney’s pre-2010 tax returns are, they cannot be worse than the speculation he will eventually receive.

To see why, imagine that one of three things is true about Romney: (1) he did nothing wrong, (2) he did something politically embarrassing (like find ridiculous tax loopholes), or (3) he did something blatantly illegal (like something that would have made him participate in the 2009 IRS program). Option 1 is a non-issue. Option 2 is not politically expedient but not altogether damning; Romney could even take some of the heat off by claiming to be the best candidate to shut down these loopholes given his first-hand knowledge of the tax system. Option 3 is game over.

The public intuitively understands that if (1) were true, Romney would have come forward already. (Let’s define the “public” as independents who haven’t already decided who to vote for. We know that ideologues from both sides are lost causes here.) Maybe he is reluctant to let everyone know he made gazillions of dollars those years, but that is a hell of a lot better than the beating he is receiving right now. So we can eliminate option 1 from the list. This is inference #1.

That leaves us with option 2 and option 3. But if both are possible, then our rational expectation of Romney’s sleaziness falls somewhere in between 2 and 3. In other words, we believe on average that Romney is worse than the guy who found tax loopholes but better than the guy who did something illegal. However, that implies that Romney should come forward if he is type 2; releasing his returns will prove that he is not as bad as the average between 2 and 3 and thus leave Romney’s reputation in better shape.

As such, the only type who does not come forward is the worst type. Put differently, by not releasing his returns, the public should rationally infer that the worst thing is true. This is inference #2.

For now, the public seems to understand inference #1 but not inference #2. However, it is only matter of time before they draw that conclusion; after all, it is logically valid. So, for now, Romney can get away without releasing the documents. But over time, things will only get worse as the public slowly reaches inference #2.

If I were Romney’s advisor, I would have him release the documents immediately. Whatever is on them cannot be as bad as where this public speculation is headed. The decision is whether to handle the blow-back now–three months before the election–or wait until October. Clearly the former is the better option.

Video explanation below:

International Relations 101

As a part of my continued philosophy to do things exactly once and do them right, I have begun a video series on international relations. Here’s the first video in YouTube form:

The project started when I began stringing together notes from the Intro to IR class I TA’d for last spring. (It also spawned a book project, but that’s a subject for another day.) In any case, outlining the lectures has given me a better idea of what we are currently doing in IR and what frustrates me about the way we teach it. The series will probably be around fifty videos. I hope you enjoy them.

Libya Will Take a While

Civil wars almost always end when one side completely defeats the other militarily. This process usually takes a long time. Libya will likely fit the pattern, especially since Gaddafi cannot use his airforce due to the no-fly zone, while the rebels do not really have one. Make no mistake about it: we will be enforcing the no-fly zone for a while.