Civil wars almost always end when one side completely defeats the other militarily. This process usually takes a long time. Libya will likely fit the pattern, especially since Gaddafi cannot use his airforce due to the no-fly zone, while the rebels do not really have one. Make no mistake about it: we will be enforcing the no-fly zone for a while.
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