Bargaining over the Bomb: The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations

Abstract: Why do states acquire nuclear weapons? Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process—i.e., credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate. This book proves the existence of settlements and the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. It then provides two main explanations as to why states proliferate anyway. First, if the would-be proliferator expects to lose the ability to construct nuclear weapons in the future, the states face a commitment problem: the rival state would like to promise to continue providing concessions into the future but will renege once proliferation is no longer an option. And second, if the proliferator’s rival faces some sort of uncertainty—whether regarding the potential proliferator’s ability to go nuclear or regarding its previous proliferation activity—the optimal offer can entail positive probability of investment.

In production at Cambridge University Press.

2 responses to “Bargaining over the Bomb: The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations

  1. Pingback: Welcome! | William Spaniel

  2. Pingback: The Power Shift Myth: Understanding Preventive War | William Spaniel

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s