#### PS 0500: Intervention

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https://williamspaniel.com/classes/IR22

#### Outline

- Why care about civil wars?
- Commitment problems
- Civil war settlement
- The critical barrier
- Mechanisms of peacekeeping and peacemaking



In a state of civil war since forever.



In a state of civil war since 2003.

#### A Festering Problem

- Terrorists can thrive in the absence of a strong centralized government
- Civil wars create (or are evidence of) weak governments
  - Also creates the potential for grievance

#### The Solution?

- If you want to stop terrorism, you might also have to stop civil wars and insurgencies
- How?

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- If you want to stop terrorism, you might also have to stop civil wars and insurgencies
- How?
  - We need to know the cause of ongoing civil conflict to stop it
    - We already know why wars happen
    - But what issues are problematic in civil war?

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You can either let me do a quick search, or we can wait a half hour for the K-9 unit to arrive. It's hot. Waiting would be worse for both of us.





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
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
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
Trust you? Ha! I'll wait.



























# What is a time-inconsistency commitment problem?


- 1. There exists an outcome that is better for both parties than the outcome that actually occurs.
- 2. If one player could credibly commit to a certain action in the future, the players would reach the mutually preferable outcome.

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#### Absolute versus Limited War





World War II

Spanish-American War

# Question: Are absolute or limited interstate wars more common? Why?

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About 2/3rds of wars are limited

#### Why Limited War?

- Wars are costly (dead people, destroyed buildings)
- If we knew what the outcome of war would be, we could just implement that outcome without fighting

### Why Limited War?

- Thus, one reason states might start fighting is due to disagreement over what the outcome would look like
- But war acts as a learning process
  - States will eventually converge their expectations of war and be willing to negotiate a settlement

### The opposite is true of civil war.

Only 1 in 5 civil wars ends in negotiated settlement

### Why? Commitment Problems.


## **Enforcing the Peace**

- After a limited interstate war ends, both sides maintain their weapons
  - Treaty is enforceable because breaking it reverts to costly conflict


## **Enforcing the Peace**

- After a limited interstate war ends, both sides maintain their weapons
  - Treaty is enforceable because breaking it reverts to costly conflict
- After a limited civil war ends, one side gives up its arms to reintegrate


# A Commitment Problem




# A Commitment Problem



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# What resolves the civil war settlement commitment problem?



Walter



Walter

# Walters






It's all about third party enforcement.

Walter


## Third Party Enforcement

- A third party can monitor and enforce a treaty
  - If the government steps out of line, the third party can protect the former rebel group
  - Deters the government from exploiting the vulnerable surrendering group

#### **New UN Peacekeeping Missions By Year**



#### **Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Missions**



# Important Qualities of an Enforcer

- 1. Interest in the peace
- 2. Militarily competent
- 3. Costly signal

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#### Do You Care?

- Enforcers only work if they will actually intervene when push comes to shove
  - The U.S. in Somalia
- Economic self-interest or old colonial ties are a good start

## Important Qualities of an Enforcer

- 1. Interest in the peace
- 2. Militarily competent
- 3. Costly signal

#### Are You Weak?

- If the government can militarily defeat the intervener, the rebels won't surrender
- The third party needs to actually be an enforcer, otherwise there is nothing stopping the government from exploiting the defenseless

# Important Qualities of an Enforcer

- 1. Interest in the peace
- 2. Militarily competent
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#### Who Do You Want to Defend You?

- We are willing to enforce this peace treaty.
   To prove it, we have dispatched 100 observers to your country.
- We are willing to enforce this peace treaty.
   To prove it, we have dispatched 10,000 dudes with semi-automatic assault rifles.

### Third Party Enforcement

- A third party can monitor and enforce a treaty
- But finding a third party that meets the three critical requirements is not easy


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# Mediation












# Peace Subsidies




# **Monitoring Disarmament**

#### **Prisoner's Dilemma**


# Player 2



# Monitoring Agreement



# Reduce First Strike Advantages





# What have we learned?

#### **IR Basics**

- Anarchy
- Sovereignty
- Proximate versus Underlying Causation

# Conflict and Cooperation

- Prisoner's Dilemma
- Shadow of the Future
- Coordination Problem

#### Mechanisms

- Information Problems
- Incentives to Misrepresent
- Costly Signaling
- Commitment Problems
- Principal-Agent Problems
- Collective Action Problems

#### Inference Problems

- Correlation versus Causation
- Observational versus Experimental Studies
- Selection Effects
- Selecting on the Dependent Variable
- Oddly-Coded Data

