

Nuclear Weapons in 300 Minutes (or Less!)

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<https://williamspaniel.com/classes/nuclearpolitics2019/>

Outline

- The Nuclear Club (and Friends)
- Why Proliferate?
- Effects of Proliferation
- Managing the Atom

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United States (1945)

- Manhattan Project
- Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings
- Would have been a lot worse if the Nazi scientists had won the race
 - ...but fortunately the Nazis were Naziing



Soviet Union (1949)

- Manhattan Project spies
- US knew the Soviets were developing a bomb but chose not to launch preventive war
 - Immediately after WWII
 - No intelligence
- Cold War starts in earnest

United Kingdom (1952)

- Tube Alloys
- Agreement with the United States

France (1960)

- France and the United States do not have as intimate a relationship as the U.S. and the U.K.
- France sought strategic independence

China (1964)

- Sino-Soviet split

India (1974)

- India does not like Pakistan very much
- Tested the “Smiling Buddha,” a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” in 1974
- Remained mostly dormant until 1998. (Hold that thought...)

Israel (1979)

- Israel does not have nuclear weapons

South Africa (1979)

- The Vela Incident
 - A US satellite (Vela Hotel) detected a flash in the Atlantic Ocean between South Africa and Antarctica
- Built due to concerns of civil war spillover from Angola
- Dismantled at the end of Apartheid

Soviet Successor States

- Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus had nuclear weapons on their soil during the Soviet Union's breakup
- Moscow still had command control
- Countries accepted cash to dismantle the weapons and forgo native nuclear development

Pakistan (1998)

- Five weeks after India's nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan tested six bombs
- Pakistan is now “too nuclear to fail”
- A.Q. Khan network

The 1998 Ig Nobel Prize Winners

The 1998 Ig Nobel Prizes were awarded at the 8th First Annual Ig Nobel Prize Ceremony, at Harvard's Sanders Theatre. The ceremony was webcast live.

SAFETY ENGINEERING: Troy Hurtubise, of North Bay, Ontario, for developing, and personally testing a suit of armor that is impervious to grizzly bears. [REFERENCE: "Project Grizzly", produced by the "National Film Board of Canada. ALSO: *Bear Man: The Troy Hurtubise Saga*, by Troy Hurtubise, Raven House Publishing, Westbrook, ME, USA, 2011.]

BIOLOGY: Peter Fong of Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, for contributing to the happiness of clams by giving them Prozac.

[REFERENCE: "Induction and Potentiation of Parturition in Fingernail Clams (*Sphaerium striatinum*) by Selective Serotonin Re- Uptake Inhibitors (SSRIs)," Peter F. Fong, Peter T. Huminski, and Lynette M. D'urso, "Journal of Experimental Zoology, vol. 280, 1998, pp. 260-64.]

PEACE: Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, for their aggressively peaceful explosions of atomic bombs.


CHEMISTRY: Jacques Benveniste of France, for his homeopathic discovery that not only does water have memory, but that the information can be transmitted over telephone lines and the Internet. [NOTE: Benveniste also won the 1991 Ig Nobel Chemistry Prize.]

[REFERENCE: "Transatlantic Transfer of Digitized Antigen Signal by Telephone Link," J. Benveniste, P. Jurgens, W. Hsueh and J. Aissa, "Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology - Program and abstracts of papers to be presented during scientific sessions AAAAI/AAI.CIS Joint Meeting February 21-26, 1997"]


SCIENCE EDUCATION: Dolores Krieger, Professor Emerita, New York University, for demonstrating the merits of therapeutic touch, a method by which nurses manipulate the energy fields of ailing patients by carefully avoiding physical contact with those patients.

North Korea (2006)


- Conducted crummy tests in 2006 (possibly a fizzle), 2009, and 2013
- Scarier tests twice in 2016 and once in 2017




2006




2009



9/2016



2017



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Argentina/Brazil

- Had simmering tensions in the 1980s
- Both proficient in nuclear technology but opted against proliferating
- Now have a joint nuclear commission and share technology

Australia

- Site of UK's initial nuclear tests
- Largest uranium reserves in the world
- Had a brief exploration

Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine

- Soviet nuclear weapons
- Ukraine had 3rd largest stockpile
- No command and control
- Allowed Moscow to recover them in exchange for economic concessions

Egypt

- Slow exploration and pursuit in the 1970s
- Effort went away after the Camp David Accords

Iran

- Long running interest in nuclear weapons
- 2015: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Iraq

- Also had long running interest in nuclear weapons
- Never made real progress
- Operation Scorch Sword
- Operation Opera
- Potential motivation for Iraq War

Japan

- Most nuclear proficient country of the non-nuclear weapons states
- US reaffirmed alliance support when Japan moved toward proliferating
- Now is a staunch supporter of non-nuclear norms

Libya

- One of the longest-running programs
- Ultimately went nowhere
- U.S. traded what little progress they made for some minor economic concessions

South Korea

- Another very nuclear proficient non-nuclear weapons state
- US reaffirmed alliance support when South Korea moved toward proliferating

Saudi Arabia

- Has started showing greater interest in nuclear technology since Iran's push

Sweden

- Neutrality preference
- Limited military budget and chose to build conventional weapons instead

Syria

- Very small progress in nuclear science
- Operation Orchard

Taiwan

- US reaffirmed its alliance benefits when Taiwan moved toward proliferating

(West) Germany

- Another highly proficient non-nuclear weapons states
- Has a nuclear weapons “sharing” agreement with the United States


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
Capacity (Supply Side)

- Can't build what you don't understand
- Also need good industrial base (or lots of manpower) to construct weapons
- Explains initial nonproliferation, but does not have much explanatory power anymore

Capability and Proliferation Over Time



Estimated Nuclear Proficiency, 2001



Security (Demand Side)

- Main purpose of nuclear weapons is coercive
- Don't need to build nuclear weapons if you don't have any disputes

Prestige

- Nuclear weapons possession is an exclusive club
- Makes other countries recognize your importance, allegedly
- Also makes everyone hate you, and there are other things that a state could do with the money

Domestic Politics

- Centralized decision structure makes them useful for insecure autocrats
- But autocrats also take a long time to build weapons

Costs

- Development is expensive, but it's only one piece
 - Maintenance
 - Delivery
 - Disposal
- There are more costly than actually building a bomb!

Preventive War

- Can't build nuclear weapons if you don't have the facilities to do it
- And if you can't protect your facilities, then you might as well not build them in the first place







Bargaining

- Proliferation causes externalities to others
 - One state's security gain is another's security loss
 - Additional risk of accidental nuclear war
 - Environmental damage from testing
 - Additional risk of black market nuclear technology

KEVIN
COSTNER

SERGEY
SHNYRYOV

NATALIYA
VDOVINA

STANISLAV
PETROV

EVERY MOMENT COUNTS



A PETER ANTHONY AND STATEMENT FILM

THE MAN WHO SAVED THE WORLD

STATEMENT PRESENTS A FILM BY PETER ANTHONY, STANISLAV PETROV, "THE MAN WHO SAVED THE WORLD", KEVIN COSTNER, SERGEY SHNYRYOV, NATALIYA VDOVINA, GALINA MALININA, OLEG KASSIN, IGOR FILIPYEV, GILTS JAKOVLEV, MUSIC BY ROBERT DE NIRO, MATT DAVEN, WALTER CRONKITE, AND ASHTON KUTCHER
EDITED BY KRISTIAN EDINIS, PRODUCED BY PETER SCHULTZ, DIRECTED BY MORTEN HEUGBERG AND MORTEN HESSE, A.C.E., PRODUCED BY ANDERS LØRSTEDT AND KIM HATTELSEN, A.S.C.
WRITTEN BY PETER ANTHONY, PRODUCED BY JACOB STAGERG, DIRECTED BY PETER ANTHONY



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Bargaining

- Why not offer concessions instead?
 - Both win: no costs and no externalities
- Fairly common historically
 - Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Soviet Successor States, Libya, Iran
- To explain proliferation, we need to first explain why parties couldn't reach a deal instead

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Optimists and Skeptics

- Lots of people think that nuclear weapons are very important
- Lots of other people think they aren't

Compellence vs. Deterrence

- To compel someone is to convince them to give up something
- To deter someone is to convince someone not to alter the status quo

Compellence vs. Deterrence

- Optimists think that nuclear weapons can compel states to give up concessions
 - Other weapons do that
 - Nuclear weapons are just bigger weapons

Compellence vs. Deterrence

- Pessimists think that nuclear weapons do not work for compellence
 - Is “give me your outlying region or I will nuke you” a credible threat?

Compellence vs. Deterrence

- More people think that nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence
 - Is “if you invade Washington DC, I will nuke you” a credible threat?

Compellence vs. Deterrence

- Some really skeptical people think that nuclear weapons deter only in extreme cases
 - Is “if you invade Hawaii, I will nuke you” a credible threat?
 - Is “if you invade Seoul, I will nuke you” a credible threat?

Compellence vs. Deterrence

- But perhaps this distinction is silly
- Imagine that nuclear weapons are good at deterrence
 - Then they act as an insurance policy in a war
 - That insurance policy raises a state's war payoff
 - If a state has a greater war payoff, then it must receive better negotiated settlements to not fight...
 - ...which means it can compel more out of others

Example

- War without nuclear weapons:
 - .1 chance A will win and will get value of 1
 - .3 chance of stalemate and A will get value of .5
 - .6 chance B will win and A will get 0
- A's expected gains are:
 - $(.1)(1) + (.3)(.5) + (.6)(0) = .25$

Example


- War with compellent nuclear weapons:
 - .4 chance A will win and will get value of 1
 - .3 chance of stalemate and A will get value of .5
 - .3 chance B will win and A will get 0
- A's expected gains are:
 - $(.4)(1) + (.3)(.5) + (.3)(0) = .55$


Example

- War with deterrent nuclear weapons:
 - .1 chance A will win and will get value of 1
 - .3 chance of stalemate and A will get value of .5
 - .6 chance B will win but A's nukes deter B from going more than half way, so A earns .5
- A's expected gains are:
 - $(.1)(1) + (.3)(.5) + (.6)(.5) = .55$

Latent Nuclear Capacity

- Suppose nuclear weapons are useful and states don't want others to develop them
- Then those countries should act with caution when in disputes with countries that could proliferate





Mutually Assured Destruction

- Suppose two nuclear weapons states are self-preserving and possess secured, second-strike capable nuclear weapons
- Is there incentive to fight a war?

Secured Second Strikes

- The United States had three methods of nuclear retaliation
 - Strategic bombers
 - Intercontinental ballistic missiles
 - Submarine-launched ballistic missiles

Secured Second Strikes

- Reason why Soviet Union and United States had way more nuclear weapons than necessary to destroy the entire world
- 68,000 down to 4,100

Instability Paradox

- But if we both have secured second strikes, what stops me from engaging in a conventional war against you?
- You can't nuke me because I can nuke you right back

Obsolescence


- Some think that major war has been obsolete for a long time
 - Mutually assured destruction did not do much to add to the peace

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

- Developed in 1968
- Obliges recognized nuclear weapons states to work toward eliminating nuclear weapons
- Binds signatories to not develop nuclear weapons



By Some Accounts...

- The best treaty ever
- The worst treaty ever
- A treaty with a marginal but useful effect


Additional Protocol

- Developed in 1994 to tighten weapons inspections safeguards
- Was a focal point of the JCPOA


Agreements and Capacity

- Reaching agreements does not seem to slow down one's ability to produce nuclear weapons by much


Japan Pre and Post-1972




South Korea Pre and Post-1975




Taiwan Pre and Post-1977



Argentina Pre and Post-1986



Brazil Pre and Post-1986



Atoms for Peace Program

- US-based initiative to begin nuclear science sharing
- Has led to extensive bilateral relations, power assistance, fuel delivery, and research reactor construction






Figure 1. Total Number of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements Signed, 1950–2000






Proliferation Security Initiative


- W. Bush era initiative
- Created by John Bolton
- Designed to create a worldwide anti-trafficking net
- Ships and intelligence





International Atomic Energy Agency

- Two primary functions
 - Weapons inspections
 - Distribution of nuclear technology



Nuclear Weapons Free Zones

- Further legal fortification against development of nuclear weapons
- Also prevents stationing or passing through of other states' nuclear weapons

