Winning with the Bomb by Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal

H_i: Nuclear-weapon states are more likely to prevail in either gaining concessions or convincing an opponent to back down in their crises than are non-nuclear-weapon states.

*H*₂: Opponents of nuclear-weapon states are more likely to end crises sooner than opponents of non-nuclear-weapon states.

H₃: Nuclear-weapon states in symmetric dyads are less likely to prevail in their crises than those in asymmetric dyads.

*H*₄: Opponents of nuclear-weapon states in symmetric dyads are less likely to end their crises sooner than those in symmetric dyads.

H₅: Nuclear-weapon states will be more prone to prevail and to face shorter crises when saliency is high.

Dyad: (n) "something that consists of two elements or parts"

Salience: (n) "the quality of being particularly noticeable or important; prominence."

Analysis: "the two dependent variables from the hypotheses are an indicator of whether an actor prevails and the duration of the conflict."

Independent Variables: "Of the 1,218 crisis actors in these data, 221 (18%) have nuclear weapons."

Violence levels is another indicator used to measure the ultimate outcome, measured as a four-point categorical variable from the ICB data.

Models: "Cox proportional-hazard estimation" used for the duration variable. Probit models for the outcome variable.

Results: "When evaluating all crises, nonweapon states have about a 40% probability of prevailing in their crises. This probability increases to 54% for nuclear states in asymmetric dyads and drops back to 41% in a symmetric dyad"

Conclusion: "Nuclear weapons provide more than prestige, they provide leverage; nuclear weapons help states win concessions quickly in salient conflicts." "Though nuclear weapon states tend to fare better at the end of their crises, this does not necessarily mean that the weapons are a net benefit for peace and stability."