

NEUTRAL INTEVENTION

PSC/IR 265: CIVIL WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

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
100 YEARS AGO

THE GOLD RUSH



At the end of the nineteenth century large numbers of AMERICANS were frequently

seen to be **HURRING** toward **ROADS** in the ground, hoping to find **GOLD**. Most of them never even found the holes in the ground. But at least they all got **EXERCISE** and **FRESH AIR**, which kept them **HEALTHY**. And health is more important than **GOLD**. ... Isn't it? You get the **GOLD** if you can spot me.



Overview

1. Ukraine Update
2. Civil War Termination Commitment Problem
3. Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement
4. Costly Signaling
5. The Iraq Surge
6. The Syrian War and ISIL

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The Latest

- Putin: Crimea annexed.
- 1 dead.
 - 999 more until we call it a war...

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Principle of Convergence

- War transmits information
- Rejecting offers credibly reveals strength
- So do battlefield outcomes
- Costs => war ends when it loses informational relevance

One Slight Detail

- What percentage of interstate wars end in negotiated settlement?
- What percentage of civil wars end in negotiated settlement?

One Slight Detail

- 55% of interstate wars end in negotiated settlement
- Only 20% of civil wars do
- What gives?


It's a commitment
problem. Also,
there's still no "s" in
my last name.




Civil War Realities

- Settlements ask for combatants to do the “unthinkable”—give up weapons in the absence of a credible enforcer
- War continues

A Commitment Problem



A Commitment Problem





**Brotherly Leader and Guide
of the Revolution of Libya**



Muammar Gaddafi

1969

1974

1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

2004

2009

**Brotherly Leader and Guide
of the Revolution of Libya**

Main Problem

- Power controls distribution of settlement
 - But peace requires disarmament...which changes the distribution of power
- Power is indivisible...
 - ...or at least extremely hard to divide

Interstate War

- This isn't a problem with interstate wars
- After war, both states maintain militaries
 - These militaries sustain prior power
 - Failure to adhere to an agreement reverts back to war, costs

Type Matters

- Some civil wars are fought over the regime (i.e., Libya)
- Some wars are fought over regional autonomy (i.e., Georgia)
- Which is more susceptible to the commitment problem?

Type Matters

- Regional autonomy is easier to negotiate
 - Region controls local government and can keep arms
 - Keeps other side from reneging, just like in an interstate war

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If enforcement is
the problem, third
party enforcement
is the solution.



Making Peace

- Third parties act as arbiter
 - Observe the terms of settlement
 - Observe compliance to those terms
 - Intervene (politically, militarily) if violations persist

Evidence

- No guarantee: 2/37 bargained resolution
- Guarantee: 6/6 bargained resolution

Evidence

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 - Selection problem?

Evidence

- No guarantee: 2/37 bargained resolution
- Guarantee: 6/6 bargained resolution
 - Selection problem?
 - Similar patterns among parties that negotiated
 - Qualitative evidence: agreements w/o third parties

The Solution!

- We should have more interventions everywhere!!!

Not so
fast.



Effective Third Parties

1. Self-interest
2. Military capability
3. Signal of resolve

Self-Interest

- Intervention is costly
- Unwilling to pay? You can't enforce peace
- Who fits this category?
 - Economic investments, colonial ties, military alliances

Military Capability

- If the new government can overrun you, you are not an effective deterrent
 - Bright spot: most states involved in civil wars aren't internationally powerful
 - Just about any competent state will work

Signal of Resolve

- How can the parties be sure the other side will intervene and not run at first blood?
 - Military tripwires
 - Costly signaling

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Applying to Grad School

- Immediately after accepting an offer, you will have to pay a deposit
 - Why do schools do this?
 - Does it matter if the deposit is refundable?

Getting Engaged

- You are supposed to spend $\$xn$ dollars, where x is your monthly income and n is some arbitrary number of months the diamond industry picked from a dart board

Costly Signal

- Problem: Schools and potential spouses have a hard time differentiating between committed and uncommitted types
 - Incomplete information!
- Cash payment informs them about commitment

A photograph of the Italian pop group Jagged Bionda performing on stage. The three members, all with long, curly blonde hair, are wearing matching shiny, sequined silver outfits. The central member is holding a microphone and has her right hand raised, showing a large, ornate silver glove with multiple rings. The background is dark with stage lights.

IF YOU LIKED IT


**THEN YOU SHOULDA PUT A
COSTLY SIGNAL ON IT.**

**IF YOU NEED AN EXPENSIVE RING TO VERIFY
CREDIBLE COMMITMENT TO YOUR
RELATIONSHIP**



**YOU'RE ABOUT TO MARRY THE
WRONG PERSON.**

Season 3 House of Cards Spoilers

A man with grey hair, wearing a dark suit, white shirt, and a dark red tie, is seated in a large, dark leather armchair. He is looking slightly upwards and to his right with a serious expression. The setting is an office with a large window in the background covered by sheer curtains. On either side of the chair, there are dark wooden side tables. The table on the left holds a framed photograph of three men in suits. The table on the right holds a framed photograph of two men in suits. The lighting is dim, creating a somber and professional atmosphere.

**And how can I know
I can ever trust you again?**





**Because I just lit
two million dollars on fire.**

Costly Signal

- Not all signals that are costly are effective costly signals
- Critical component: cost paid by one type is cost another type would *not* pay

Example

- You are a third party state
- Continued war in my country is costly to you
 - But I don't know how costly. (You know yourself better than I do.)
 - 50% chance: \$10 billion
 - 50% chance: \$5 billion

Example

- Intervention is (more or less) free if no one breaks the peace or if you leave immediately
- Intervention is costly otherwise
 - Say, \$7 billion

Example

- I am the gov't of the country and thinking about taking advantage of a shift in power
- I want to challenge if you are uncommitted to keeping the peace but don't want to if you are committed

Example

- With no additional information, suppose I prefer trying to renege on the settlement
 - 50% chance I am successful
 - 50% chance you intervene and do bad things to me

Example

- No extra info => I challenge => uncommitted type leaves and committed type puts down the challenge
 - Costs \$7 billion to the committed type

You Are the Committed Type

- Why will saying “I’m the committed type” not work?

You Are the Committed Type

- You have a stack of \$10 billion in front of you. Is there something you can do with that money to credibly reveal information?
 - Intervention costs \$7 billion. You value peace at \$10 billion. Uncommitted type values peace at \$5 billion.

Solution

- Take \$5,000,000,001 and light it on fire.

Why It Works

- Uncommitted type's best case scenario: I believe it is committed and don't challenge the peace
 - Committed type receives \$5 billion for no war

Why It Works

- Net payoff: -\$1
- But uncommitted type could do nothing and earn \$0 instead!
 - Conclusion: Anyone who burns \$5,000,000,001 cannot possibly be uncommitted

Why It Works

- Committed type burns the money
- I see the money burnt, update my belief that you are the committed type, and do not challenge

Why It Works

- You earn \$4,999,999,999 for this outcome
- If you don't burn, I infer that you are uncommitted and challenge
 - You intervene and earn \$3 billion

Critical Components

1. Your types care about the issue at differential values
2. You as the committed type sacrificed more than the less committed type would be willing to sacrifice

Problem Set

- What happens if you try burning less money?
- What happens with three types?

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Iraq War in Four Phases

1. Negotiation
2. Invasion
3. Civil War
4. Surge

Negotiation

- Dragged on for months
- Very public

Invasion

- Extremely successful
- 172 coalition deaths
- Defection rampant
- Saddam choose to run, not fight









Invasion

- Last 10 days (3/30 to 4/9)
- Ultimately relatively unimportant
 - Wikipedia: 16,477 words on the Iraq War. Only 1125 (6.8%) about the invasion



Civil War

- Lawlessness prevails for a while after war
 - Part of this was bad policy
 - Part of this was...well...the government disappeared over ten days

Civil War

- August 2003: Jordanian embassy and U.N. headquarters bombed
 - 17 and 22 dead
 - Blasted a car onto a rooftop








Civil War: Why?

- New democratic rules
- Commitment problem
- Saddam's pro-Sunni propaganda
- Problems with splitting the country

Ethnoreligious Groups


-  Sunni Kurd
-  Sunni Arab / Sunni Kurd
-  Sunni Arab
-  Shia Arab / Sunni Arab
-  Shia Arab
-  Turkoman
-  Yezidi

0 50 100 Kilometers
0 50 100 Miles



Iraq

Oil fields
and pipelines



Results

- Government not widely recognized as legitimate within Iraq
- Fighting, lawlessness continues
- U.S. suffers casualties
- American political opposition to war increases


The Surge

- Bush wants more troops in Iraq
- Opposition in Congress fights
- Bush makes it a sticking point of his presidency and carries on

Overall Weekly Iraq Attack Trends

(Includes Found and Cleared Bombs)

September 2004 – November 2007



This chart has been added since the last report. It is included to show overall insurgent activity and methods of attack and therefore includes found and cleared bombs. Source: SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only)—Chart includes executed attacks and potential (found and cleared) events; as of Nov 30 2007.

Some Explanations

- More troops
- Counterinsurgency strategy
- David Petraeus
- All the Sunnis had been killed already

More Troops?

- More is better than less
- 30,000 is a lot
 - But 130,000 were already there

Strategy?

- Clear-hold-build

Petraeus?

- Okay
- If Petraeus was the answer, what's the policy prescription?

Petraeus?



-

-

ne answer, what's the policy

Petr



ne



cy

Blood Bath?

- Losing is a part of the learning curve
- Even if you know things are going bad, commitment problem is still scary

Another Explanation

- Bush signaled commitment to Iraqi security
 - He would not have wasted the political capital otherwise
 - Moderates internalize American commitment
- U.S. offers payments to Sunnis

Costly Signals

- Burning money is a metaphor
 - Except on House of Cards
- Troop deployments and military exercises are the real life analog

Sunni Decision

1. Continue fighting against Shia and a resolved United States
2. Accept payments and work with United States against AQI

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Timeline

- U.S. begins withdrawal from Iraq in 2007, completes in 2012
- Civil war had ended
- Sunni outcome was not favorable

IS Forms


- Previously Al Qaeda in Iraq
 - Suppressed by U.S. surge operations
- Splits from Al Qaeda over ideological differences and bureaucratic infighting

ISIL Transition

- Power vacuum forms in Syria
- IS moves troops into region and takes territory, becoming the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

Expansion Back to Iraq

- Begins “conquering” territory in central Iraq
 - Remarkable part: Iraqi army mostly retreats
 - Local resistance not great



Different Tactics

- ISIL controls, taxes land
 - Al Qaeda didn't do this
 - Makes the group more vulnerable to conventional war, aerial bombings

Southern Front

- Shia regions have affinity for Shia-controlled government
- IS has ideological issues with Shias in general
- IS therefore mostly in Sunni Iraq

Meanwhile, in the north...



Persian Gulf Uprising

- After war ends, Kurds see window of opportunity to revolt
- Saddam brutally represses rebellion
- U.S. establishes no-fly zone

NO-FLY ZONE

36th Parallel

IRAQ

Baghdad

33rd Parallel

NO-FLY ZONE



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Iraqi Kurdistan

- Enjoys *de facto* independence during interwar period
- Has functioning government and military
- Transitions to autonomous region following the Iraq War





Northern Front

- ISIL currently fighting Kurdistan
- Because they have a functional government that provides for them, Kurds have skin in the game

Meanwhile in Turkey

- Turkey is 18% Kurd
- Ongoing conflict since 1984



Peace?

- Power sharing agreement seemed possible in 2013
- Then the Syrian Civil War brought Kurdish refugee crisis
- Conflict ongoing

Regional Problem

- All states with Kurdish populations are uneasy about Kurdistan
- Turkey especially concerned due to PKK
- 2008, 2011: light invasions of Kurdistan to target PKK operations