

MEDIATION

PSC/IR 265: CIVIL WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

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Overview

- Midterms
- Mediation

Risk-Return Tradeoff

- Asymmetric information
- Greater demand, higher payoff when offer accepted but high degree of rejection
- Lower demand, low payoff accepted but low degree of rejection

Time Inconsistency Commitment Problem

- Outcome is inefficient
- Second-mover would like to promise to cooperate later but cannot credibly commit to it

War's Inefficiency Puzzle

- If war is costly, mutually preferable settlements exist
- Why not bargain?
- Information problems and commitment problems

AK-47

- Durable gun for rebel groups in nasty locations
- Cheap prices post-Cold War, making war less costly
- Lcky

- *My main argument is that on close inspection none of the principal rationalist arguments advanced in the literature holds up as an explanation because none addresses or adequately resolves the central puzzle, namely, that war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war.*

Fearon

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Slantchev

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King et al

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
Bargaining Question

- Suppose both the rebel leader and government dictator have private concerns that their audiences do not share. If war occurs, the rebel leader still internalizes the 1 unit of value if the rebel group wins and the cost c_R regardless. In addition, if the rebels win, he derives some private benefit $b > 0$ for being in charge of the government.
- Meanwhile, if war occurs, the government dictator still internalizes the 1 unit in value if the government wins and the cost c_G regardless. As we will see in the second half of class, though, dictators who fight and lose wars are often killed or forced into exile. Let $d > 0$ represent the amount of suffering that causes. Thus, if the rebels win, the dictator pays d . Intuitively, suppose $d > b$. That is, the pain from death is a stronger force than the benefits of steak dinners.

Predicting War

- If we could predict the outbreak of civil conflict stemming from coordination problems, so would target governments
- Governments would take actions to stop it (King et al)
- We thus would not actually see the civil conflict

Tank Man?



Petro Poroshenko's Company?

ПО РОШЕНКО




Star Trek?





Midterm 1 Distribution



Projected Grades

- Simple way to think about it: add 10 points to your midterm grade

Projected Grades

- More complicated: multiply your problem set grade by 2 and add that to your midterm grade times .25, then divide by .45
- $[(ps)(2) + (m)(.25)]/.45$

- A: 90-100
- A-: 85-90
- B+: 79-85
- B: 75-79
- B-: 70-75
- C: 60-70
- D: 50-60

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The Game

- R is weak (50%) or strong (50%)
 - If strong, war pays \$6.50 to R and \$2.50 to G
 - If weak, war pays \$4.50 to R and \$4.50 to G

Round 1

- Shuttle diplomat
- Bias for peace

Round 2

- Shuttle diplomat
- Bias toward receiver

Round 3

- Shuttle diplomat
- Bias toward proposer

Round 4

- Informed mediator
- Bias for peace

Round 5

- Informed mediator
- Bias toward proposer

Round 6

- Informed mediator
- Bias toward proposer

Round 7

- Informed mediator with hard intel
- Bias for peace

Round 8

- Informed mediator with hard intel
- Bias for proposer

Round 8

- Informed mediator with hard intel
- Bias for receiver

Fey and Ramsay 2010

- A “shuttle diplomat” facilitates information transmission between parties
 - Does not change the structure of negotiations, offer subsidies, or offer information

Fey and Ramsay 2010

- Shuttle diplomacy can only duplicate the outcome of the game without the diplomat
 - If you have incentive to misrepresent to the other party, you have the same incentive to misrepresent to the mediator