

POST COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS

PSC/IR 265: CIVIL WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

WILLIAM SPANIEL

WJSPANIEL.WORDPRESS.COM/PSCIR-265

Overview

1. UNSC
2. Experiment
3. Outside Options and the Security Council
4. Coups
5. Inferences about Intervention

Overview

1. UNSC
2. Experiment
3. Outside Options and the Security Council
4. Coups
5. Inferences about Intervention

Permanent Members




Non-Permanent Members (elected by regions for two year terms)



Voting Rules

- Need 9 votes to pass
- All five permanent members have veto power
- Abstentions allowed



Post-Cold War

- U.S. often uses UNSC to advance its strategic interests

UNSCR 1973

- U.S. wanted to help rebels in Libya win the war.
- Establishes no-fly zone in Libya

UNSCR 1973

- After voting, China refers to the resolution as a disaster.
- How did China vote?

**IF YOU DIDN'T WANT THE
RESOLUTION TO PASS**



**YOU SHOULD HAVE USED YOUR
VETO POWER**

THEY WERE BEING STRATEGIC

I GUARANTEE IT

Overview

1. UNSC
2. Experiment
3. Outside Options and the Security Council
4. Coups
5. Inferences about Intervention

**NO MORE
TALKING**

The Game

- We are negotiating over a particular policy
- Currently, the policy gives you \$6 and me \$1
- I am thinking of paying to move the policy closer to what I like

The Game

- You can offer me a new version of the policy
 - Call the offer q , where q is at least \$0 but no greater than \$7
- I can accept the offer or reject it

The Game

- If I accept, I have to pay \$1 to implement the policy
 - I receive $\$q - \1
 - You receive $\$7 - \q

The Game

- If I reject, I decide whether to maintain the status quo or implement a new policy myself
 - If I implement the new policy, I take all \$7 for myself
 - But doing this unilaterally is costly, so I lose \$5

**MAKE ME
AN OFFER**

Solution

- Suppose I reject your offer. Should I implement a new policy on my own?
 - Yes: $\$7 - \$5 = \$2$
 - Maintaining the status quo only gives me \$1

Solution

- Thus, you must make sure I receive at least \$2 from your offer
- It costs \$1 for me to implement a negotiated deal, so you must offer me at least \$3 to induce me to accept

Solution

- Is offering \$3 better?
 - Yes—you keep \$4
 - If you make me an unacceptable offer, I reject and you receive \$0

Solution

- Is offering more than \$3 smart?
 - No—I accept regardless, so offering more is a needless concession

Outside Options

- An **outside option** is your alternative if bargaining breaks down
- Your outside option is costly but desirable
 - Gives you all of the benefit from the policy
 - But costs you \$5

Outside Options

- Costs => incentives to negotiate
- You anticipate how costly my outside option is to implement and offer me enough to make me not want to implement it
 - I get what I want
 - You benefit by taking the surplus

Overview

1. UNSC
2. Experiment
3. Outside Options and the Security Council
4. Coups
5. Inferences about Intervention

What's Up with China?

- U.S. had the credibility to intervene in Libya on its own
- Intervention is costly
- China traded UNSC legitimacy for a more moderate intervention

Costs Matter


- Suppose the cost of going it alone is extremely high
- Should China offer to trade UNSC legitimacy for a more moderate intervention?

Costs Matter


- No—U.S. does not have a credible threat to intervene on its own
- So China should not make concessions
 - U.S. doesn't like it but can't do anything about it

Syrian Intervention

- This is why we don't see UNSC compromise on Syria
 - U.S. can't go in on its own
 - If you are okay with the status quo, no need to offer assistance







Overview

1. UNSC
2. Experiment
3. Outside Options and the Security Council
4. Coups
5. Inferences about Intervention

The Cold War Era

- Suppose you successfully executed a coup
- The U.S. demands free and fair elections as a condition for aid
- You don't like elections
- How strong is America's bargaining position?

Superpower Competition

- If you don't get aid from the U.S., you could always ask the Soviet Union
 - Thus, the American bargaining position was weak
 - Lots of aid to not-so-democratic regimes

The Post Cold War Era

- Suppose you successfully executed a coup
- The U.S. demands free and fair elections as a condition for aid
- You don't like elections
- How strong is America's bargaining position?

Freedom Competition

- If you don't get aid from the U.S., you could always ask the E.U...
- ...who will also demand free and fair elections as a condition

Before and After

- Should we expect elections following a coup more often pre or post Cold War?
- Should we expect the frequency of coups to increase or decrease after 1990?

Overview

1. UNSC
2. Experiment
3. Outside Options and the Security Council
4. Coups
5. Inferences about Intervention

Rebel Biased Intervention

- Of all cases where third-parties have intervened on behalf of rebels, those with interventions won more frequently than those without
- Why?

Government Biased Intervention

- Of all cases where third-parties have intervened on behalf of the government, those with interventions won roughly as often as those without
- Why?

The Trick

- Rebels are almost always at a disadvantage
- Intervention is costly, so interventions are increasingly likely the closer the combatants are to military parity

The Trick


- If rebels are extremely likely to lose, should we expect intervention?
- If rebels and government are almost balanced, should we expect intervention?

The Trick

- Interventions occur more frequently in the second case
- So rebel-biased intervention appears successful because
 1. Intervention increases military capacity
 2. Intervention is occurring when the rebels are relatively powerful on their own







**Brotherly Leader and Guide
of the Revolution of Libya, 1969-2011**

The Trick

- If government is extremely likely to win, should we expect intervention?
- If rebels and government are almost balanced, should we expect intervention?

The Trick

- Interventions occur more frequently in the second case
- So government-biased intervention appears irrelevant because
 1. Intervention increases military capacity
 2. Intervention is occurring when the government is relatively weak

