

PSC/IR 106: Wrap Up

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Format of the Not-A-Final

- Four IDs, pick 3 (30 points)
- Two quotes, pick 1 (10 points)
- Four short answers, pick 3 (60 points)
- Definitely **not** cumulative
 - But anything discussed in the second half of class is fair game (e.g., the bargaining model of war)

Office Hours

- Today, 10-12: Me
- Today, 12-2: Matt
- Tomorrow, 10-12: Doug
- Tomorrow, 12-2: Brad
- Tomorrow, 2-4: Gleason
- I will not answer emails sent after 6 pm tomorrow.

Evaluations

- Available now
- If 95% of you do them in the next two days, everyone will receive 1% extra credit for the class
- Must do course and TA evals

What have we learned?

The Basics

- Anarchy
- Sovereignty
- Proximate versus Underlying Causes
- Strategic Interdependence

Conflict and Cooperation

- Prisoner's Dilemma
- Shadow of the Future
- Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
- Coordination Problem

Rationalist Explanations for War

- War's Inefficiency Puzzle
- Asymmetric Information
- Incentives to Misrepresent
- Preventive War
- Preemptive War
- Commitment Problems

Trade

- Absolute Advantage
- Comparative Advantage
- Courts as Coordination Devices
- Absolute versus Relative Gains

The Democratic Peace (?)

- Correlation versus Causation
- Selectorate
- The Capitalist Peace

Leaders

- Principal-Agent Problems
- Diversionary War
- Gambling for Resurrection
- Pandering

Trade Relations

- A steel company in the United States wants tariffs on imported steel.
 - Makes steel more expensive for US consumers but increases US steel producers' profits.

Economic Sanctions

- Selecting on the Dependent Variable
- Selection Problem
- Costly Signaling

International Institutions

- Public Goods
- Collective Action Problems
- Issue Linkage

United Nations

- Veto Power
- Strategic Voting
- Outside Options
- Bribery
- Rally 'Round the Flag

Membership

Permanent Members



Non-Permanent Members (elected by regions for two year terms)



Nuclear Weapons

- Mutually Assured Destruction
- Deterrence
- Compellence
- Obsolescence of War
- Mixed Strategies

Terrorism

- Rationality
- Spoiling

Intervention

- Absolute versus Limited War
- Post-Civil War Commitment Problem
- The Critical Barrier

Math is evil.

not
Math ^ is evil.

Prisoner's Dilemma

Player 2

Player 1

Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

Defect

3, 3

1, 4

4, 1

2, 2

Cooperate	Defect
3, 3	1, 4
4, 1	2, 2

Stag Hunt

Player 2

Player 1

		Stag	Hare
Player 1	Stag	3, 3	0, 2
	Hare	2, 0	1, 1

Preventive War

Rising State

Build

Don't Build

Declining State

Prevent

.6, .1

.6, .2


Peace

.3, .6

.8, .2

	Build	Don't Build
Prevent	.6, .1	.6, .2
Peace	.3, .6	.8, .2


Sanctions




Why Formal Theory?


- Don't assume outcomes
- Construct interactions and see what follows

Distribution of Conflict Lengths



Distribution of Sanctions Duration





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