# NEUTRAL INTEVENTION

PSC/IR 265: CIVIL WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS
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#### Overview

- 1. Ukraine Update
- 2. Civil War Termination Commitment Problem
- 3. Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement
- 4. Costly Signaling
- 5. The Iraq Surge

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## The Latest

- Putin: Crimea annexed.
- 1 dead.
  - 999 more until we call it a war...

## For Your Education...

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- Suppose Nebraska declared independence tomorrow. Would it be a nuclear power?
  - Not unless Nebraskans magically commandeered the weapons and hacked the launch codes.

# For Your Education...

 Then don't call Ukraine a former nuclear power.

# Budapest Memorandum

- Says: Ukraine gives up nuclear ambitions,
   U.S./U.K./Russia respect boundaries.
  - Russia is clearly violating the agreement.
  - Does Ukraine really "regret" the agreement?

# Not Really

- No one signing it would have believed it would have held up under these conditions.
  - Everyone is getting exactly what the expected.
- Ukraine was broke upon independence.
  - Traded potential nuclear program for cash and subsidies.

## America's Current Game Plan

 We don't have a credible threat to intervene militarily.

#### Modest Partisan Differences in Views of U.S. Actions in Ukraine

Do you think it is more important for the U.S. to ...


	Total %	Rep %	Dem %	Ind %	
Take a firm stand against Russia actions	29	37	30	25	
In addressing the situation should the U.S					
Consider military options	8	16	5	5	
Only consider economic/political options	19	19	24	18	
Don't know	2	1	1	3	
Not get too involved in the situation	56	50	55	62	
Don't know	<u>15</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>13</u>	


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
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## America's Current Game Plan

Sanctions threat.



# Sanctions Expectations

- Incomplete information can result in sanctions.
  - Incomplete information is hard to measure.
  - Why can we use leader tenure as a proxy?

# **Sanctions Expectations**

- Incomplete information can result in sanctions.
  - Incomplete information is hard to measure.
  - Why is leader tenure a useful proxy?

# Sanctions Expectations

- Newer leaders more likely to be sanctioned.
  - Putin is old news.
- International consensus more likely to result in sanctions.
  - Remains unseen.

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# Principle of Convergence

- War transmits information.
- Rejecting offers credibly reveals strength.
- So do battlefield outcomes.
- Costs => war ends when it loses informational relevance.

# One Slight Detail


- 55% of interstate wars end in negotiated settlement.
- Only 20% of civil wars do.
- What gives?


It's a commitment problem. Also, there's still no "s" in my last name.




## Civil War Realities


- Settlements ask for combatants to do the "unthinkable"—give up weapons in the absence of a credible enforcer.
- War continues.











# Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution of Libya

## Main Problem

- Power controls distribution of settlement.
  - But peace requires disarmament...which changes the distribution of power.
- Power is indivisible...
  - ...or at least extremely hard to divide.

#### Interstate War

- This isn't a problem with interstate wars.
- After war, both states maintain militaries.
  - These militaries sustain prior power.
  - Failure to adhere to an agreement reverts back to war, costs.

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If enforcement is the problem, third party enforcement is the solution.



# Making Peace

- Third parties act as arbiter.
  - Observe the terms of settlement.
  - Observe compliance to those terms.
  - Intervene (politically, militarily) if violations persist.

## Evidence

- No guarantee: 2/37 bargained resolution.
- Guarantee: 6/6 bargained resolution.

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### Evidence

- No guarantee: 2/37 bargained resolution.
- Guarantee: 6/6 bargained resolution.
  - Selection problem?
    - Similar patterns among parties that negotiated.
    - Qualitative evidence: agreements w/o third parties.

## The Solution!

 We should have more interventions everywhere!!!

Not so fast.



# **Effective Third Parties**

- 1. Self-interest
- 2. Military capability
- 3. Signal of resolve

### Self-Interest

- Intervention is costly.
- Unwilling to pay? You can't enforce peace.
- Who fits this category?
  - Economic investments, colonial ties, military alliances.

# Military Capability

- If the new government can overrun you, you are not an effective deterrent.
  - Bright spot: most states involved in civil wars aren't internationally powerful.
  - Just about any competent state will work.

# Signal of Resolve

- How can the parties be sure the other side will intervene and not run at first blood?
  - Military tripwires.
  - Costly signaling.

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## Applying to Grad School

- Immediately after accepting an offer, you will have to pay a deposit.
- Why do schools do this? Does it matter if the deposit is refundable?


# **Getting Engaged**

• You are supposed to spend \$xn dollars, where x is your monthly income and n is some arbitrary number of months the diamond industry picked from a dart board.

# Costly Signal

- Problem: Schools and potential spouses have a hard time differentiating between committed and uncommitted types.
  - Incomplete information!
- Cash payment informs them about commitment.





# Costly Signal

- Not all signals that are costly are effective costly signals.
- Critical component: cost paid by one type is cost another type would not pay.

- You are a third party state.
- Continued war in your country is costly to you.
  - But I don't know how costly. (You know yourself better than I do.)
    - 50% chance: \$10 billion
    - 50% chance: \$5 billion

- Intervention is (more or less) free if no one breaks the peace or if you leave immediately.
- Intervention is costly otherwise.
  - Say, \$7 billion.

- I am the gov't of the country and thinking about taking advantage of a shift in power.
- I want to challenge if you are uncommitted to keeping the peace but don't want to if you are committed.

- With no additional information, suppose I prefer trying to renege on the settlement.
  - 50% chance I am successful.
  - 50% chance you intervene and do bad things to me.

- No extra info => I challenge => uncommitted type leaves and committed type puts down the challenge.
  - Costs \$7 billion to the committed type.

# You Are the Committed Type

 Why will saying "I'm the committed type" not work?

# You Are the Committed Type

- You have a stack of \$10 billion in front of you. Is there something you can do with that money to credibly reveal information?
  - Intervention costs \$7 billion. You value peace at \$10 billion. Uncommitted type values peace at \$5 billion.

### Solution

• Take \$5,000,000,001 and light it on fire.

- Uncommitted type's best case scenario: I believe it is committed and don't challenge the peace.
  - Committed type receives \$5 billion for no war.

- Net payoff: -\$1.
- But uncommitted type could do nothing and earn \$0 instead!
  - Conclusion: Anyone who burns \$5,000,000,001
     cannot possibly be uncommitted.

- Committed type burns the money.
- I see the money burnt, update my belief that you are the committed type, and do not challenge.

- You earn \$4,999,999,999 for this outcome.
- If you don't burn, I infer that you are uncommitted and challenge. You intervene.
  - You earn \$3 billion.

# Critical Components

- 1. Your types care about the issue at differential values.
- 2. You as the committed type sacrificed more than the less committed type would be willing to sacrifice.

### Final Question

 Why is burning \$1 a signal that is costly but not A Costly Signal?

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### Iraq War in Four Phases

- 1. Negotiation
- 2. Invasion
- 3. Civil War
- 4. Surge

### Negotiation

- Dragged on for months.
- Very public.
- Probably not ultimately about WMD.

### Invasion

- Extremely successful
- 172 coalition deaths
- Defection rampant
- Saddam choose to run, not fight



IS WHAT ALLOWS U.S. GROUND TROOPS TO CONDUCT





### Invasion

- Last 10 days (3/30 to 4/9)
- Ultimately relatively unimportant
  - Wikipedia: 16,477 words on the Iraq War. Only
     1125 (6.8%) about the invasion



### Civil War

- Lawlessness prevails for a while after war.
  - Part of this was bad policy.
  - Part of this was...well...the government disappeared over ten days.

### Civil War

 August 2003: Jordanian embassy and U.N. headquarters bombed






## Civil War: Why?

- New democratic rules
- Commitment problem
- Saddam's pro-Sunni propaganda
- Problems with splitting the country






#### Results

- Government not widely recognized as legitimate within Iraq.
- Fighting, lawlessness continues.
- U.S. suffers casualties.
- American political opposition to war increases.

## The Surge

- Bush wants more troops in Iraq.
- Opposition in Congress fights.
- Bush makes it a sticking point of his presidency and carries on.



## Some Explanations

- More troops
- Counterinsurgency strategy
- David Petraeus
- All the Sunnis had been killed already

## More Troops?

- More is better than less.
- 30,000 is a lot.
  - But 130,000 were already there.

# Strategy?

Clear-hold-build

### Petraeus?

- Okay.
- If Petraeus was the answer, what's the policy prescription?

## Petraeus?



ne answer, what's the policy



### **Blood Bath?**

- Losing is a part of the learning curve.
- Even if you know things are going bad, commitment problem is still scary.

## **Another Explanation**

- Bush signaled commitment to Iraqi security.
  - He would not have wasted the political capital otherwise.
  - Moderates internalize American commitment.
- U.S. offers payments to Sunnis.

#### Sunni Decision

- 1. Continue fighting against Shia and a resolved United States.
- 2. Accept payments and work with United States against AQI.