COMMITMENT PROBLEMS

PSC/IR 265: CIVIL WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

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Overview

- 1. Commitment problems
- 2. Breaking Bad
- 3. Yugoslavia's Meltdown
- 4. When do commitment problems occur?
- 5. Coordination problems => commitment problems
- 6. China's Internet censoring














My Concern.









Your car is full of stuff covered with a blanket. You must be a drug dealer. I'm going to search your vehicle now.









You can either let me do a quick search, or we can wait a half hour for the K-9 unit to arrive. It's hot. Waiting would be worse for both of us.

I promise to conduct a quick search.




You can either let me do a quick search, or we can wait a half hour for the K-9 unit to arrive. It's hot. Waiting would be worse for both of us.

I promise to conduct a quick search.

Thanks, I'll wait.



A Commitment Wait for K9 **Problem** Me Allow Search Ranger Quick Thorough





A Commitment Problem Me Allow Search Ranger Quick Thorough 3, 2 1, 3

A Commitment Problem Me Allow Search Ranger Quick Thorough 3, 2 1,3

A Commitment Problem Me Allow Search Ranger Thorough

1, 3





A Commitment Problem

Me Wait for K9 2, 1

A Commitment Wait for K9 **Problem** Me **Allow Search** Ranger Quick 3, 2

A Commitment Problem Me Allow Search Ranger Quick Thorough 3, 2 1,3

What is a time-inconsistency commitment problem?

- 1. An outcome exits that is better for all than the outcome that actually occurs.
- 2. If one player could credibly commit to a certain action in the future, the players would reach the mutually preferable outcome.

Credibility

• A threat or promise is **credible** if and only if an individual has incentive to follow through on the threat or promise when the action must be made.

You can either let me do a quick search, or we can wait a half hour for the K-9 unit to arrive. It's hot. Waiting would be worse for both of us.

I promise to conduct a quick search.



You can either let me do a quick search, or we can wait a half hour for the K-9 unit to arrive. It's hot. Waiting would be worse for both of us.

I promise to conduct a quick search.

Thanks, I'll wait. (Translated: Bro, you're not even remotely credible. Bro.)




A Commitment Problem Me Allow Search Ranger Quick Thorough 3, 2 1,3

TL;DR: Don't trust the police if you didn't call for them.


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
This is a common problem.




Meet Walter White.



He's a meth cooker without a distributor.




He's also a mildmannered high school chemistry teacher.



He's also a mildmannered high school chemistry teacher. In other words, he is completely clueless.


Meet Tuco Salamanca.




Tuco knows what's up.




Hey Walter, why don't you give me some of your meth. I promise I will split the revenue with you.







Sounds great!
Nothing could
possibly go wrong.



A Commitment Problem



A Commitment Problem



Overview

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World War II



- Nazis occupy
 Yugoslavia
- Divide and conquer strategy

The Ustase



- Yugoslavia's largest ethnic group is Serb.
- Nazis prop up a Croat government—the Ustase.
 - Ustase commits atrocities against Serbs.



Cold War Yugoslavia



- Communist government led by Josip Tito.
- Relative ethnic peace.
- Motto: Yugoslavia has seven neighbors, six republics, five nations, four languages, three religions, two scripts, and one goal: to live in brotherhood and unity.

Spoiler Alert

- Cold War is going to end and Yugoslavia is going to break up.
- There will be blood.
- Why?

- - Then why weren't they killing each other during communist rule?

- - But Croats and Serbs weren't killing each other most of the time before communism.
 - Intermarriage rates were at their highest.



Croatia in Transition

- Gains independence in 1991.
- Holds democratic elections.
- Franjo Tudjman runs on nationalist platform, wins.





Lighting a Powder Keg

- Croatian government places these patches on police uniforms.
- Serb police in Croatia are not very happy about this.
- Serbs in Croatia declare their own independence.

Proximate vs. Underlying Cause


Patch is not a useful explanation for the conflict.

Proximate vs. Underlying Cause

- Patch is not a useful explanation for the conflict.
 - If it was, the policy recommendation would be "don't put patches on police uniforms."

Proximate vs. Underlying Cause

- Shifting power between the parties is.
 - Croatian government had not yet solidified power.
 - Serbs had a temporary strength.



A Commitment Problem

Serbs War Now 2, 1


Serbs Have Help



- Slobodan Milošević sends Serbian forces to assist Serbs in Croatia.
- ...but Croatia eventually wins.

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Two Key Preferences: War Now **Cost of War** Serbs Wait and See Croats Be Not So Nice Be Nice 3, 2 1,3

Two Key Preferences: War Now **Extent of Abuse** Serbs Wait and See Croats Be Nice **Be Not So Nice** 3, 2 1,3

Question

- What determines:
 - 1. the cost of war?
 - 2. the extent of abuse?

A Couple Answers

- What determines:
 - 1. the cost of war?
 - economic interdependence
 - 2. the extent of abuse?
 - extent of power shift


A Couple Answers

- What determines:
 - 1. the cost of war?
 - economic interdependence (now)
 - 2. the extent of abuse?
 - extent of power shift (after the midterm)



Hajj, Old School

- Major 20th Century innovation: flying to Mecca.
- Before: Sailing.



Ethnic Exposure

- Port cities had significantly more ethnic mixing.
- Muslims provided an important complementary economic service: trade to the west.

Incentives to Cooperate

- Muslims brought money to Hindus in these port cities.
- Hindus could not easily expropriate this wealth.
 - Not easy to magically create a trading business.

Lasting Effects

- Port cities substantially more ethnically mixed.
- Yet, from 1850-1950, port cities had 80% fewer race riots than non-port cities.

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NO MORE TALKING

- You are poor, lowly undergrads people living under an oppressive dictator.
- You would like to protest to demand concessions.

- If too few of you protest, the government will have enough bullets to shoot all of you.
- If enough of you protest, the government will have to negotiate with you.

- The dictator has n 1 bullets, where n is the number of students in this room.
 - So all of you need to protest, or all protestors will die.

- Dead people earn \$0.
- Non-protestors earn \$4.
- A successful protest yields \$5 to all protestors.

- Write your name and a GIGANTIC "P" if you want to protest or a GIGANTIC "N" if you don't.
- Pass them forward when you are done.

Multiple Outcomes

- Multiple outcomes are rational.
- If everyone thinks everyone else will protest, protesting makes sense.
- If anyone thinks a single person will not protest, not protesting makes sense.

Protesting Is Hard


- High risks => incentives to stay home.
- Incentives to stay home => fewer protestors.
- Fewer protestors => higher risks.



Ima Yeah, that's a commitment problem.

• We thereas

thereafter.





Yeah, that's a commitment problem.

War Now **Protestors**


2, 1

Accept Concessions

Government

Uphold Renege 3, 2 1, 3

The Arab Spring Game



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TALKALLYOU WANT.

 We're playing the same game before...EXCEPT everyone will make their decision one at a time. Decisions are public.

China

- Everyone knows that China censors their Internet.
- They don't like negative comments about their government.

China


- Everyone knows that China censors their Internet.
- They don't like negative comments about their government. Right?





k l'm d?

It's about collective action.



Strategy

- Record social media posts
- Monitor them in real time.
- Check what stays versus what is removed.

Result

- Chinese government doesn't really care about criticism.
- Main concern: collective action, causing problems discussed earlier.

