

BIASED INTERVENTION

PSC/IR 265: CIVIL WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

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Overview

1. Midterms
2. UNSC
3. Experiment
4. Outside Options and the Security Council
5. American Civil War
6. Nuclear Security

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Westphalian Sovereignty

- Established by 1648's Treaty of Westphalia
 - Ended 30 Years' War
- Ruler has exclusive right to decide internal affairs
- *Not* Responsibility to Protect

External Subsidy

- Quid-pro-quo
- Makes war costlier

Negative Externality

- Costs third parties pay for decisions unrealed to them
- Example: Refugees in civil war
- Incentivizes outsiders to pay for peace

Firefighting versus Policing

- Firefighting: reactive
- Policing: proactive
- Policing is much costlier

Tilly

- Once you have a monopoly on power, it is hard to credibly commit to playing nice.
 - You have all the power. Who will stop you?

Kuperman

- Why no information?
- Policy implications?

Collier et al

- It's a trap!
- Ways to get out of it?



Ollivant

- Costly signaling

Sanctions

- You don't know whether a leader is weak or strong
- Risk-return tradeoff: you might buy off just the weak type
- Observed sanctions are biased toward the toughest cases

Barrier/Convergence

- Convergence: War transmits information, leading to settlement
- Barrier: Settlements incredible because of disarmament
- Territory: If rebel group is winning, grant autonomy
 - Settlement credible because both sides maintain arms

Costly Signal

- Only burning \$2B gives unresolved type incentive to bluff
- Need to burn between \$3B and \$5B

Church of the Holy Sepulchre

- ~~God~~
- ~~Jesus~~
- Muslim Guard

Who Is This?

- ~~My mother~~
- B-R-A-N-I-S-L-A-V S-L-A-N-T-C-H-E-V

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Permanent Members




Non-Permanent Members (elected by regions for two year terms)



Voting Rules

- Need 9 votes to pass
- All five permanent members have veto power
- Abstentions allowed



Post-Cold War

- U.S. often uses UNSC to advance its strategic interests

UNSCR 1973

- U.S. wanted to help rebels in Libya win the war.
- Establishes no-fly zone in Libya

UNSCR 1973

- After voting, China refers to the resolution as a disaster.
- How did China vote?

**IF YOU DIDN'T WANT THE
RESOLUTION TO PASS**



**YOU SHOULD HAVE USED YOUR
VETO POWER**

THEY WERE BEING STRATEGIC

I GUARANTEE IT

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**NO MORE
TALKING**

The Game

- We are negotiating over a particular policy.
- Currently, the policy gives you \$6 and me \$1.
- I am thinking of paying to move the policy closer to what I like.

The Game

- You can offer me a new version of the policy.
 - Call the offer q , where q is at least \$0 but no greater than \$7.
- I can accept the offer or reject it.

The Game

- If I accept, I have to pay \$1 to implement the policy.
 - I receive $q - 1$. You receive $7 - q$.

The Game

- If I reject, I decide whether to maintain the status quo or implement a new policy myself.
 - If I implement the new policy, I take all \$7 for myself.
 - But doing this unilaterally is costly. I lose \$5.

**MAKE ME
AN OFFER**

Solution

- Suppose I reject your offer. Should I implement a new policy on my own?
 - Yes. $\$7 - \$5 = \$2$.
 - Maintaining the status quo only gives me \$1.

Solution

- Thus, you must make sure I receive at least \$2 from your offer.
- It costs \$1 for me to implement a negotiated deal, so you must offer me at least \$3 to induce me to accept.

Solution

- Is offering \$3 better?
 - Yes. You keep \$4.
 - If you make me an unacceptable offer, I reject and you receive \$0.

Solution

- Is offering more than \$3 smart?
 - No. I accept regardless, so offering more is a needless concession.

Outside Options

- An **outside option** is your alternative if bargaining breaks down.
- Your outside option is costly but desirable.
 - Gives you all of the benefit from the policy
 - But costs you \$5

Outside Options

- Costs => incentives to negotiate
- You anticipate how costly my outside option is to implement and offer me enough to make me not want to implement it.
 - I get what I want.
 - You benefit by taking the surplus.

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What's Up with China?

- U.S. had the credibility to intervene in Libya on its own.
- Intervention is costly.
- China traded UNSC legitimacy for a more moderate intervention.

Costs Matter


- Suppose the cost of going it alone is extremely high.
- Should China offer to trade UNSC legitimacy for a more moderate intervention?

Costs Matter


- No—U.S. does not have a credible threat to intervene on its own.
- So China should not make concessions.
 - U.S. doesn't like it but can't do anything about it.

Syrian Intervention

- This is why we don't see UNSC compromise on Syria.
 - U.S. can't go in on its own.
 - If you are okay with the status quo, no need to offer assistance.







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What Caused the Civil War?

- Be careful!
 - If you've been paying attention in class, your most likely answers don't actually answer the question...

Common Answers

- Are you from a northern state?
 - Slavery!
- Are you from a southern state?
 - States' rights!

Sup.



What Caused the Civil War?

- States rights?
 - Clearly bargainable.
- Slavery?
 - Indivisible! A rationalist explanation for war!
 - Quit your 21st Century thinking

Slavery: Definitely Bargainable

- 3/5^{ths} Compromise
- Missouri Compromise
- Kansas-Nebraska Act
- Compromise of 1850

Lincoln Tried Peaceful Coercion

- Emphasizes commitment to peaceful reintegration in inauguration speech
- Maintains blockade to push the South back to the bargaining table

The War that Wasn't

- Fort Sumter: traditional start of Civil War
 - Except no one died
 - Bull Run didn't occur for another three months

Lincoln's Evolving Strategy

- Original plan: blockade South, bleed them, reach a bargain
- Sudden change of mind: invade to deter international recognition

Great Britain, Great Cause of War

- Great Britain needed South for cotton
- British diplomats discussed recognition of Confederacy
- Lincoln invades to forestall recognition

Preventive War

- Recognition from Britain and others would have built long-term economic strength and increased chances of military assistance
- Large shifts in power => commitment problem => war

Lesson

- Intervention does not just affect the course of war—it affects the outbreak of war.
- States concerned about intervention have incentive to adopt anti-intervention technology.

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Bargaining Breakdown

- Common explanation: North Korea wants more stuff and nukes are coercive.
- But nukes are costly.
 - Why not bargain instead?

**NO MORE
TALKING**

The Game

- We are negotiating over \$10.
- You begin by offering me a division of it.

The Game

- I accept, reject, or build.
 - Accepting locks in the settlement.
 - Rejecting starts a war. You win 50% of the time.
War costs you \$2 and me \$1.
 - Building costs me \$1.

The Game

- If I build, power shifts.
- You offer me a new deal. I accept or reject.
 - Accepting locks in that division.
 - Rejecting leads to war. I win 70% of the time. You pay \$2 and I pay \$1 in costs.

**MAKE ME
TWO OFFERS.**

Solution

- Suppose I build.
- My war payoff is $(\$10)(.7) - \$1 = \$6$.
 - I reject offers less than \$6 and accept anything else.

Solution

- When do I accept in the first round?
- If I build, I receive \$6 in the future but pay \$1.
 - Rejecting is worse than this.
 - So I build in response to offers smaller than \$5 and accept otherwise.

Let's Make a Deal

- If nukes provide power, rival will have to give up more in future negotiations.
- Rival can give up roughly that much from the start.

Let's Make a Deal

- Potential nuclear power has no incentive to proliferate
 - No point in paying the cost
- Rival wins too
 - No proliferation
 - Steals surplus because no cost paid

Connection

- Similar story in Voeten article.
- General lesson: you don't need to pay for outside options for them to influence bargaining behavior.

Bargaining Breakdown

- This is why most states do not have nuclear weapons...
- ...which makes it all the more puzzling why some do.

Credible Commitment

- Credible commitment to non-intervention would remove need to proliferate.
 - Nuclear weapons as deterrence

Credible Commitment

- But exogenous shocks can rapidly shift power.
 - Suppose civil war erupts
 - Rivals have a now-or-never chance to intervene
 - Commitment falls flat





**Brotherly Leader and Guide
of the Revolution of Libya**








North Korea

- Suppose a Libya-style rebellion erupts in North Korea.
 - Would South Korea/United States intervene today?
 - What about ten years ago?



Casualties

- Seoul has an *average* population density of 43,000/sq. mile.
 - A poorly targeted, poorly designed bomb would kill 11,610 people in the air blast radius alone.

Conclusion

- Circumstances under which South Korea/United States would intervene are much narrower with nuclear weapons.

Outbreak of War

- Would Libyan Civil War began if United States definitely would not have intervened?